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Abstract 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a central concept in climate change 
economics. This chapter explains the SCC and investigates it philosophically. 
As is widely acknowledged, any SCC calculation requires the analyst to make 
choices about the infamous topic of discount rates. But to understand the 
nature and role of discounting, one must understand how that concept—and 
indeed the SCC concept itself—is yoked to the concept of a value function, 
whose job is to take ways the world could be across indefinite timespans and 
to rank them from better to worse. A great deal, therefore, turns on the 
details of the value function and on just what is meant by “better” and 
“worse.” This chapter seeks to explicate these and related issues, and then 
to situate them within the evolving landscape of federal climate policy in the 
United States. 
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12.1. Introduction 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a central concept in climate change 
economics. My aim in this chapter is to explain the concept and then to look 
under its philosophical hood, so to speak. It is widely acknowledged that 
calculating the SCC involves making choices about the infamous topic of 
discount rates. But to understand the nature and role of discounting, it is 
crucial to understand how that economic concept—and indeed the SCC 
concept itself—is yoked to the concept of a value function, whose job is to 
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take ways the world could be across indefinite timespans and to rank them 
from better to worse. A great deal, therefore, turns on the details of the 
value function and on just what is meant by “better” and “worse.” I seek to 
explicate these and related issues, and then to situate them within the 
evolving landscape of federal climate policy in the United States. 
12.2. Value Functions, Discount Rates, and the Road from Value to 
Policy Choice 
Climate change economics employs two foundational concepts: the feasible 
and the valuable (Brennan, 2007). Feasibility concerns how things could be 
given technological constraints. For example, it focuses on what forms of 
conventional and environmental investment are possible, and how a given 
type and degree of investment would change the current trajectory of 
economically important phenomena. 
The most salient phenomenon for mainstream climate change policy 
analysis is the consumption of commodities whose contribution to 
individual well-being is usually measured by individuals’ willingness to pay 
for them.1 Economists try hard to understand in detail how climate change 
will impact the consumption of various commodities, although the 
economic models I’ll focus on are concerned with averages and 
aggregates. For example, the most simple models treat the issue of 
                                               
1 This is the standard economic approach to measurement. Philosophers routinely 
criticize this way of doing things. See, e.g., Hausman (2012). 
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feasibility as that of identifying the range of time paths of per capita global 
consumption that are possible given various levels of financial and 
environmental investment. That is, if we assume that time, t, is measured 
in discrete periods (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ), and that global per capita 
consumption at t is an aggregate index Ct, then climate economics is 
concerned with which time paths (C0, C1, C2, . . . ) are feasible, given 
current and future technologies.2 
The second fundamental concept for climate economics, value, is 
typically operationalized in the form of a value function (this is sometimes 
referred to as a social welfare function). The job of a value function is to 
place feasible time paths of consumption into a ranked ordering.3 In this 
way, value functions are tools for ranking the different ways the world 
could be. 
Without yet getting into the details of any particular value function, 
suppose we have one that we like—call it V—which takes each feasible 
consumption path and assigns to it a real number. (The entire path is the 
                                               
2 In this simple framework, environmental quality is relevant only insofar as it 
affects aggregate consumption. It is, however, consistent with the economic 
foundations of climate policy analysis to treat environmental quality as having 
fundamental importance. For more on this, see Sterner and Persson (2008) and 
Heal (2009). It is also possible to switch from a focus on global per capita 
consumption to the per capita consumption in each of several geographic regions. 
See, e.g., Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 
3 Strictly speaking, a value function represents an ordering, which suggests that the 
ordering is somehow prior to the function. But I will speak as if the function 
determines the ordering, since a great deal of climate economics concerns first 
choosing the form and content of the value function and only then running 
models to discover which ordering over feasible streams results. 
 4 
V-function’s “argument,” we say.) For us to “like” a value function is for us 
to think it does a good job of using such number assignments to place the 
paths into a betterness ordering, with the best sequence being assigned a 
number higher than any other. Setting aside some key technical details 
concerning measurement,4 we can use the concept of a value function to 
define the SCC as follows. 
First, determine which feasible consumption path is the business-as-
usual (BAU) path, i.e. the path that would prevail in the absence of 
additional climate policy. Now find the number, V(BAU), that V assigns to 
this BAU path. Next, determine which consumption path would result if the 
BAU path were changed in only the following respect: there is one extra 
ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted in the first period. Call this the 
emission-perturbed path, or PERE. Now find the number, V(PERE), that V 
assigns to PERE. Next, subtract V(PERE) from V(BAU) to find the V-based 
measure of the difference made by one extra ton of CO2 emissions (where 
the BAU consumption path is the comparison baseline). Now use a parallel 
calculation to find the difference made by adjusting the BAU path in only 
the following respect: reduce the first time period’s per capita 
consumption by one dollar. Call the result the consumption-perturbed 
path, or PERC, and calculate the difference it makes (again using BAU as 
                                               
4 See Broome (1991, pp. 70–5). 
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the baseline) by finding V(BAU) − V(PERC). The formula for calculating the 
SCC is then: 
 
 
(1) 
In words, the SCC is the ratio of the V-based difference made by a marginal 
unit of present emissions to the difference made by a marginal unit of 
present consumption. This ratio expresses the marginal impact on V that 
present CO2 emissions make in terms of the marginal impact that present 
consumption makes. It is a way of making these impacts comparable, so 
that (for example) the benefits of greenhouse gas abatement can be 
compared with the monetary costs associated with abatement. 
I have focused here on the SCC for the first time period, which 
expresses the difference made (across time) by marginal emissions in the 
first period in terms of the difference made by marginal consumption in 
that period. But the SCC can in principle be calculated for any designated 
time period. We will soon see why the SCC in all time periods is of special 
importance to climate economics. 
When it comes to the SCC, clearly a great deal turns on the form of 
the value function, V, and on its parameter values. As regards form, the 
standard framework in climate economics stems from an approach set out 
by Frank Ramsey in 1928 (Ramsey, 1928). Ramsey’s approach was 
SCC =
V
BAU
− V
PERE
V
BAU
− V
PERC
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utilitarian in two senses. First, Ramsey’s value function had the following 
utilitarian form: 
 
  
(2) 
   
where 𝑢(𝑐$) expresses the utility of per capita consumption level 𝑐 at t and Nt 
is the number of people alive at t. Ramsey’s approach was therefore to rank 
consumption paths in terms of the sum total of utility they contain.5 The 
second sense in which Ramsey’s framework was utilitarian is that he held 
that the betterness ordering given by a utilitarian V is ipso facto a rightness 
ordering, where a rightness ordering ranks feasible paths in terms of 
everything that matters to policy choice. Let us refer to such a tight 
relationship between value (as defined by a given V-function) and choice 
using the following phrase: 
   (3) 
Many philosophers will be comfortable with (and all philosophers will be 
familiar with) the idea—which is just the rejection of (3)—that value 
considerations cannot by themselves fully determine proper choice from 
                                               
5 This not fully accurate. For technical reasons stemming from problems with the 
idea of an infinite sum, Ramsey sought to minimize the difference between actual 
realized utility and a maximum possible amount he defined in terms of a concept 
he called bliss. 
VRamsey = Nt ⋅u(ct )
t=0
MAX
∑
Value→Choice
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among feasible policy options. Climate economists, in my experience, find 
this a harder idea to make sense of.6 I’ll return to it shortly. 
As already defined, the SCC is a marginal concept: it is the ratio of 
the difference made by a very small increase in CO2 emissions to the 
difference made by a very small decrease in first-period consumption. 
Because of these marginality assumptions, equation (1) is not the only 
formula one can use to calculate the SCC, and Ramsey once again helps 
us see why. 
Ramsey in effect showed that when the value function takes the 
following generalized utilitarian form, 
 
  
(4) 
where 𝛿 represents the utility discount rate, one can derive from V the 
following formula: 
   (5) 
Here the utility discount rate, 𝛿, is the rate at which a given increment of 
utility declines in value (as measured by its impact on V) as its enjoyment is 
delayed by one period. (Ramsey believed this parameter should be set to 
zero to yield equation (2), which is a special case of equation (4).) 𝜂 signifies 
                                               
6 This separates climate economists from health economists, since the latter are 
familiar with the idea that economists’ focus—e.g. maximizing quality-adjusted 
life years (QALYs)—is not the only consideration relevant to health policy. 
VGenUtil = Nt ⋅ u(ct )
t=0
MAX
∑ ⋅ 1(1+δ )t
ρt =δ +η ⋅ gt
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the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, which represents the 
“curvature” of the utility function 𝑢(∙), or the degree to which enjoying more 
and more consumption yields less and less utility. Finally, 𝑔$ is the rate of 
growth in per capita consumption between two periods, 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, along a 
given time path of consumption. What Ramsey showed is that for any given 
time period along any given path of consumption, one can use equation (5) 
to derive that period’s consumption discount rate (𝜌$). A consumption 
discount rate is a rate of indifference: for example, period 0’s consumption 
discount rate it is the rate of return required in period 1 in order for V to be 
indifferent between investing a marginal unit of consumption in period 0 and 
someone’s consuming it in period 0. Thus if period 0’s consumption discount 
rate is 0.05, then a 5 percent return is required in period 1 in order for V to 
be indifferent between consuming a marginal unit in period 0 and investing it 
instead. 
Consumption discount rates offer a sort of shortcut around using 
equation (1) to calculate SCC values. So long as the incremental 
emissions associated with the SCC concept create incremental 
consumption changes in future time periods that are genuinely marginal7 
(when compared with the BAU consumption path), we can use equation 
(5) to derive each period 𝑡’s consumption discount rate. We then define 
                                               
7 See Dietz and Hepburn (2013) for the requirements of genuine marginality. 
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period 𝑡 + 1’s consumption discount factor as	   /(/012). By multiplying each 
period’s incremental change in consumption by its consumption discount 
factor, we can express period 𝑡 + 1’s consumption in terms of its period 𝑡 
equivalent. Then, once we have a full time path of consumption discount 
factors, we are in a position to translate incremental consumption in any 
period into its equivalent in another period. This enables us to use a time 
path of consumption discount factors to express a time stream of 
incremental consumption changes as a “present value,” that is, as the 
change in period 0 consumption that is equivalent to it. In this way, we 
can avoid having to use equation (1) to calculate an SCC value: so long as 
the relevant consumption changes are truly marginal, we can use the 
consumption discount factor method instead. 
Equation (5) is sometimes called the Ramsey rule,8 but that name is 
also frequently given to a conceptually quite distinct proposition. To see 
this, note that equation (5) can be derived entirely from equation (4). 
That is, (5) gives us the marginal rate of indifference with respect to the 
value considerations embodied in V. Nothing in the manner of claim (3)—
i.e. the claim that V reflects all considerations relevant to policy choice—is 
needed to derive (5). However, if one embraces both (3) and (4), then 
                                               
8 See for example Johansson and Kriström (2015, p. 67), Adler and Treich (2015, p. 
18), and Kolstad et al. (2014, p. 229). 
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one can derive an ostensibly similar but entirely new proposition that is 
also frequently dubbed the Ramsey rule:9 
   (6) 
Here 𝑟$ represents the social rate of return on investment, or the productivity 
of capital. If one subscribes to (3) and (4), then (6) follows for reasons that, 
once again, Ramsey was the first to articulate. The idea is intuitive. If at a 
certain time, and along a certain BAU consumption path, one’s consumption 
discount rate (as given by (5) and the right-hand side of (6)) is below the 
productivity of capital, then one can increase value (as measured by V) by 
investing a bit more today in order to earn a rate of return that exceeds 
one’s V-based rate of indifference. Since we are supposing for the sake of 
argument that one subscribes to claim (3), one will apply Ramsey’s logic 
right up to the point where one’s consumption rate of indifference is exactly 
equal to the productivity of capital. The same logic will apply, mutatis 
mutandis, if the productivity of capital is currently lower than the 
consumption rate of indifference. In that case, one maximizes V by 
increasing consumption today and investing less, right up until the point at 
which the world conforms to the equality expressed in (6). 
As noted, (5) and (6) are each frequently called “the” Ramsey Rule. 
It would be useful to have different names for them, and if it were up to 
                                               
9 See for example Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 296–7), Stern (2014, p. 456), and 
Arrow et al. (1996, p. 134). 
rt =δ +η ⋅ g
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me I’d call (5) the Ramsey formula and (6) the Ramsey rule. (Even then, I 
wouldn’t want readers to assume that the Ramsey rule is a morally or 
even economically sound rule—only that it is a rule that many economists, 
including Ramsey, endorse.) In any case, the important point for now is 
that these express distinct propositions and that one will embrace the rule 
embodied in (6) only if one also embraces the tight connection between 
value and choice expressed in (3).10 
To illustrate these conceptual points, consider the view taken by 
environmental economists David Pierce, Edward Barbier, and Anil 
Markandya (PBM).11 PBM claim that the consumption discount rate given 
by (5) should reflect “current generational orientated considerations.”12 By 
this they mean, for example, that the utility discount rate should reflect 
the rate that individuals today reveal in their behavior when they trade-off 
utility within their own lives. Since people seem to show an intra-personal 
bias in favor of earlier utility over later utility, PBM’s approach to (5) has 
the implication that climate policy analysis should discount the interests of 
future generations relative to those of the current generation. That is 
actually the standard view in climate economics, and I’ll discuss it further 
later in the chapter. Yet to this standard view PBM add an unconventional 
                                               
10 Dasgupta 1982 clearly distinguishes these propositions, referring only to (6) as 
the Ramsey Rule. See in particular his equations (10) and (18). 
11 Pearce et al., 1990. 
12 Pearce et al., 1990, p. 46. 
 12 
proviso: they claim that one should first “define the rights of future 
generations”—decide what levels of consumption they are morally entitled 
to, say—and only then maximize a “current generation oriented” version 
of V subject to the constraint that future generations’ rights are fully 
respected.13 PBM are, therefore, likely to reject (3), since they do not 
believe that V captures all of the normative considerations relevant to 
policy choice. They would therefore also reject (6). But they needn’t—and 
in fact shouldn’t—reject (5), since (5) is entailed by any V-function having 
the generalized utilitarian form (4), which PBM’s current generation 
oriented V-function does. Equation (5) merely gives the marginal rate of 
indifference between consumption in different time periods as judged by 
V. This rate of indifference is relevant to choice just in case the ranking 
given by V is relevant to choice. But that ranking can be relevant to choice 
without its being the sole relevant consideration. In contrast, the Ramsey 
rule expressed by equation (6) entails that the ranking given by V is the 
sole policy-relevant consideration. 
As I’ve said, PBM are in the minority in rejecting an airtight 
relationship between value (as expressed by V) and policy choice. Most 
economists working in climate economics think that it is the job of 
economists to find a V-function that can sustain a recommendation of the 
form, “Identify the feasible consumption path that maximizes V and then 
                                               
13 Pearce et al., 1990, p. 46. 
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implement the portfolio of policies required to put the world on that 
path.”14 But it is absolutely essential to see that this default position is 
entirely discretionary: absolutely nothing in the economics dictates that 
economists must embrace this particular relationship between proper 
policy choice and the conception of value embodied in the V-function. V-
functions merely place consumption paths into an ordering. What that 
ordering signifies morally, and what public policy is to do with that 
ordering, are distinct and further questions.15 
I hope it is now clear how the concept of the social cost of carbon is 
yoked to the idea of a value function, and how the value function might or 
might not be related to the practical task of policy choice. If there is 
indeed a gap between the policies that V ranks highest and the policies 
that we should pursue all-things-considered, then the SCC will not be an 
ironclad guide to policy choice. But if there is no gap, then the SCC will be 
a very useful policy instrument. For whenever the SCC exceeds the cost 
we would have to bear today to abate a ton of CO2, we know that we 
would increase V by abating an additional ton. We also know (and this is a 
                                               
14 Or, if they insist on restricting themselves to climate policy only, their 
recommendation will take the form, “Identify the feasible consumption path that 
maximizes V, then identify the associated time-path of greenhouse gas emissions 
(or emissions reductions), and then implement the portfolio of policies required to 
put the world on that path of emissions (reductions).” This is what von Below, 
Denning, and Jaakkola call the “naïve implementation” of the Ramsey Rule. See 
von Below et al. (n.d., pp. 26–7). 
15 See (Kelleher 2017a) for an extended discussion on this point. 
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standard result in climate economics) that along the path that V ranks 
highest—what those who embrace (3) would call the “optimal” path—the 
SCC for each period will be equal to the cost of abating one more ton of 
CO2 in that period. (This last “optimality condition” is used by economists 
to help work out what the optimal path looks like.) Finally, we also know 
that the SCC along the highest-ranked path gives us the “optimal tax,” 
that is, the tax that would bring us on to the highest-ranked path if we 
applied it to each and every ton of CO2 that is emitted around the world. 
12.3. Investigating Value Functions Further 
Not all climate economists embrace a V-function falling into the generalized 
utilitarian family captured by (4). For example, in a recent book Humberto 
Llavador, John Roemer, and Joaquim Silvestre (LRS) explore and defend just 
the second half of the two-pronged view championed by Pearce, Barbier, and 
Markandya. In LRS’s view, climate economists should reject all V-functions 
that resemble (4) and from which the Ramsey formula (5) can be derived.16 
They argue instead that the entire framework should be built around a V-
function that ranks consumption paths with respect to how the worst-off 
generation fares.17 On such a view, larger benefits for better-off generations 
cannot justify smaller losses for worse-off generations, unless the trade-off 
                                               
16 Llavador et al., 2015, p. 205. 
17 Actually, LRS’s view is at once more complicated and more lenient than this, but 
I will not get into the details of their view here. 
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is part of a policy that somehow improves the situation of the worst-off 
generation. But that means LRS-style V-rankings are not interested in 
adding time-stamped gains and losses and weighing them against one 
another, and this in turn means that they have little use for the SCC concept 
as I have defined it. For it is only in the context of what economists call 
additive V-functions that the SCC becomes a relevant concept both from the 
standpoint of economics and—if policy cares about the V-function—from the 
standpoint of public policy. 
V-functions (2) and (4) are not the only ones that display additivity, 
however. A still different one is the prioritarian V-function: 
   (7) 
Like (2) and (4), a Ramsey formula specifying the consumption rate of 
indifference can be derived from (7), though it looks somewhat different 
from (5) since (7) sums not discounted utilities, but utilities that have been 
“transformed” by a function g(.) that gives less and less weight to extra 
utility the more beneficiaries already have of it.18 But like (2) and (4)—and 
quite unlike LRS’s “maximin” V-function—the additive prioritarian V-function 
and its associated Ramsey formula can be used to calculate a (prioritarian) 
SCC using the formula given by (1).19 
                                               
18 Adler and Treich, 2015, p. 296. 
19 Adler et al., 2017. 
Vprior = g(u(ct )
t=0
MAX
∑ )
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These three families of value functions—generalized utilitarian, 
prioritarian, and maximin—share the feature that they address a 
heterogeneous intra- and inter-temporal demography head-on, and 
calibrate their parameters with an eye toward yielding betterness 
orderings that acknowledge trade-offs between distinct people (or at least 
different groups of people—e.g. generations). LRS call approaches with 
this feature ethical observer approaches, while others call them social 
planner approaches. They stand in contrast to what are called 
representative agent models, which aim to make consumption path-
ranking exercises tractable by giving the societal V-function the same 
form as an anonymous currently living individual’s V-function. Economists 
like this representative agent approach because there are observational 
data from individual behavior they can use to calibrate the value 
parameters, and because they are already trained to think systematically 
about the structure and properties of individual preference. 
One significant problem for representative agent models is that they 
cannot adequately reflect prioritarian considerations. Prioritarian value 
functions like (7) rank consumption paths by applying a “concave 
transform,” g(.), to each period-specific utility and then summing the 
results of these operations across the relevant time horizon. The 
transform is used to give more weight to utility improvements that accrue 
to those who start with less of it. The resulting conception of betterness is 
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therefore conceptually distinct from a conception on which betterness is 
represented by the sum of utilities. The problem for representative agent 
models—models that treat societal betterness rankings as if they were the 
ranking of an individual—is that it is definitional of the idea of (von 
Neumann–Morgenstern) utility that betterness for an individual is 
represented by summing utilities, and not by summing concave 
transformations of utilities.20 Many representative agent proponents try to 
evade this objection by allowing prioritarian considerations to influence 𝜂, 
the value parameter representing the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption. As noted earlier, 𝜂 reflects the curvature of the utility 
function and thus the degree to which adding more and more consumption 
brings less and less utility. By increasing 𝜂, representative agent 
proponents hope to express the combined curvature of an explicit utility 
function and an implicit prioritarian transform.21 Yet not only is this 
solution conceptually quite imperfect, but it also ignores two different 
                                               
20 For more on this point, see Greaves (2015). Traeger (2010) derives a 
representative agent framework that obeys the von Neumann–Morgenstern 
axioms and that also permits concave transformations of utility. But these 
transformations are an expression of risk aversion and are relevant only in 
contexts of uncertainty; they drop out when certain consumption paths are being 
evaluated. By contrast, prioritarianism assigns values to certain consumption 
paths by summing concave transformations of period-specific utilities. So 
Traeger’s framework still cannot accommodate prioritarian considerations. 
21 See Stern (1977, pp. 241–2), Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 279–80), and 
Kaplow and Weisbach (2011) for rare exceptions in the literature that make this 
prioritarian transform explicit. 
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technical issues—explained in note 22—that absolutely require the explicit 
decomposition the representative agent proponent was hoping to avoid.22 
Whether they adopt a representative agent or a social planner 
approach to V-functions, most economists working in climate change 
economics rely heavily on revealed preference to calibrate their V-
function’s value parameters. Some go so far as to say that if parameters 
are not set in this “descriptivist” way—for instance, if they are instead set 
using “prescriptivist” a priori moral reasoning—then the whole path-
ranking exercise would no longer fall within the discipline of economics.23 
Here, for example, is Martin Weitzman: 
[C]line and Stern are soulmates in their cri de coeur justifying δ 
≈ 0 by relying mostly on a priori philosopher-king ethical 
judgements about the immorality of treating future generations 
differently from the current generation—instead of trying to back 
                                               
22 First, “implicit prioritarian” approaches work with a utility function that is unique 
up to positive affine transformations, whereas no prioritarian value function is 
invariant to positive affine transformations of the utility function. What a 
prioritarian value function requires is a utility function that is invariant to ratio 
transformations. See Adler and Treich (2015, §3.2). Second, integrating 
prioritarianism with decision theory requires an explicit choice between what 
Adler and Treich call ex ante and ex post versions of prioritarianism under 
uncertainty. Although each of these has serious theoretical costs—ex ante 
prioritarianism violates the “sure thing principle,” ex post prioritarianism violates 
the ex ante Pareto relationship between individual betterness rankings and social 
betterness rankings—any bona fide prioritation must choose between them. (See 
Adler, 2012, ch. 7.) But implicit prioritarianism standardly leads economists who 
embrace it to evade the issue altogether. 
23 See Kelleher (2017b) and Kelleher and Wagner (n.d.) for more on the so-called 
descriptivist/prescriptivist divide in climate economics. 
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out what possibly more representative members of society than 
either Cline or Stern might be revealing from their behavior is 
their implicit rate of pure time preference. An enormously 
important part of the “discipline” of economics is supposed to be 
that economists understand the difference between their own 
personal preferences for apples over oranges and the preferences 
of others for apples over oranges. Inferring society’s revealed 
preference value of δ is not an easy task in any event (here for 
purposes of long-term discounting, no less), but at least a good-
faith effort at such an inference might have gone some way 
towards convincing the public that the economists doing the 
studies are not drawing conclusions primarily from imposing their 
own value judgements on the rest of the world. (Weitzman, 2007, 
p. 712) 
Pace Weitzman, revealed preference approaches face several serious 
objections from the standpoint of policy analysis. First, they violate the 
Humean dictum that one cannot infer an “ought” from an “is.” The data that 
revealed preference advocates wish to use to calibrate the value parameters 
reveal the trade-offs that real-life agents do in fact make in their daily lives. 
But, arguably, the V-function required for social policy analysis should reflect 
societal judgments about how intergenerational trade-offs should or ought to 
be made. It would be one thing if revealed preference advocates warned, as 
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PBM did earlier, that such V-functions capture just one among many other 
considerations relevant to policy choice. But a great many economists who 
prioritize revealed preference take the results of their models to indicate 
what proper policy should look like. Few say what they would need to say to 
properly heed Hume’s dictum: “The ranking of consumption paths I offer is 
more the product of quantitative sociology or anthropology than it is of 
political theory or applied ethics. So please do not assume that the ranking I 
end up with is necessarily indicative of morally justifiable social choice.” 
Instead, revealed preference proponents describe the results of their 
analyses as determining “optimal policy,” and they criticize policies that 
would deviate from the “optimum” so-defined.24 
Even if one grants that “current generation oriented” observations 
are morally relevant to policy analysis, a second problem with the 
revealed preference approach is that it is arguably predicated upon the 
wrong observational data. For the value parameters in revealed 
preference models are derived from the value parameters in individuals’ 
own, largely self-interested consumer behavior. But the path-ranking 
exercise relevant to climate policy analysis concerns ranking paths (and 
thus policies) that will impact billions of people for centuries to come. 
Referring to the types of consumer behavior that revealed preference 
advocates wish to use to set the value parameters, Nicholas Stern writes: 
                                               
24 See, for example, Nordhaus (1994, pp. 79ff.). 
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“as this borrowing and lending take place through private decisions . . . 
this does not necessarily answer the relevant question . . . namely, how 
do we, acting together, evaluate our responsibilities to future 
generations.”25 This is a strong argument against policy analysis that 
relies heavily upon the data standardly used to calibrate value parameters 
in revealed preference models. Different sorts of data could be collected, 
for example in the context of focus groups, but to my knowledge this work 
has not been done on a scale sufficient for application in policy analysis.26 
The reliance (or not) on revealed preference will inevitably influence 
how a given value function trades off well-being at one time with well-
being at another. In addition, note that whether one views a given V-
function’s trade-offs as defensible will also have much to do with one’s 
prior stance on claim (3). That is, if one begins with the view that a value 
function’s ranking of feasible consumption paths should be an all-things-
considered rightness ranking, then one will seek a value function that 
incorporates all normative considerations one deems relevant to policy 
choice. However, if one instead uses a value function to rank paths in 
terms of some but not all normatively relevant considerations, then the 
trade-offs embodied in the value function need not coincide perfectly with 
the full set of trade-offs one ultimately wants embodied in policy. Consider 
                                               
25 Stern, 2010, p. 51. 
26 For a proof-of-concept example of what this could look like, see Frederick (2003). 
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the following distinction between moral principles described by John 
Broome: 
Very roughly, our moral duties can be divided into duties of 
beneficence—promoting good—and duties of justice . . . The need 
for this division can be illustrated by an example that comes from 
Judith Jarvis Thomson. A surgeon has in her hospital five patients, 
each in need of a different organ for transplant. One needs a new 
heart, one needs a new liver, and so on. Each will die unless she 
gets a new organ. The surgeon kills an innocent visitor to the 
hospital and distributes her organs to her patients. Thereby the 
surgeon saves five lives at the expense of one. She successfully 
promotes good. Yet she clearly acts wrongly . . . It must be that 
there is some principle of morality that can conflict with the duty 
to promote good, and is sometimes important enough to override 
it. In this particular case, it is evidently a duty not to inflict harm 
on someone, even for the sake of greater general goodness. I 
take this to be a duty of justice.27 
Elsewhere Broome claims that the value function relevant to the economics 
of climate change is insensitive to justice-based considerations and instead 
                                               
27 Broome, 2016, p. 921. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was the first IPCC report to reference and 
incorporate this distinction between goodness and justice. Broome was a lead 
author of the relevant section. See Kolstad et al. (2014, p. 215). 
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aims to rank consumption paths solely in terms of their capacity to promote 
general goodness.28 But if one did not understand that this is Broome’s 
focus, one might mistakenly criticize his claims about the value parameters; 
after all, the parameters relevant to a path-ranking exercise concerned 
solely with what Broome calls “goodness” may well diverge from the 
parameters relevant to an exercise concerned with both goodness and 
justice. If one did not realize that Broome is focused on goodness only, and 
if one instead assumed he was focused on all relevant normative 
considerations, then one might be inclined to pick a misguided theoretical 
fight with him about his preferred value parameters. This in fact is my 
diagnosis of a great number of putative disagreements between philosophers 
and climate economists.29 
The key takeaway for our purposes is that since the SCC depends so 
heavily on the V-function, it could be a giant mistake—both analytically 
and dialectically—to speak of “the” SCC. For if it makes sense in different 
contexts to be interested in different kinds of path-ranking exercise, and if 
each of these employs an additive V-function, then there will be a distinct 
SCC concept tied to each sort of exercise. This is especially important in 
the context of policy, since only an SCC tied to a V-function capturing all 
                                               
28 Broome, 2012, ch. 6. 
29 I develop this analysis of prominent debates in the literature in Kelleher (2017a) 
and Kelleher (2017b). 
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relevant normative considerations should be used to identify policies that 
are “optimal” in the sense relevant to final social choice. 
The observations made in this section can be used to analyze the 
approach taken by the controversial Stern Review of the economics of 
climate change.30 Stern adopted a value function in line with (2), with a 
utility discount rate of essentially zero.31 Stern’s value function was not of 
the representative agent variety because he conceived of the utility 
discount rate as an explicitly moral parameter serving to weight utility 
gains going to distinct generations. Yet in line with more mainstream 
analyses—including just about all representative agent analyses—Stern 
chose to calibrate the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption on 
the basis of revealed preference, by drawing on studies of revealed 
consumer behavior.32 At the same time, Stern notes that his V-function 
“has no room . . . for ethical dimensions concerning the processes by 
which outcomes are reached,” and that it thereby ignores “different 
notions of ethics, including those based on concepts of rights, justice and 
freedoms.”33 Stern’s V-function was therefore in line with the goodness-
                                               
30 Stern, 2007. 
31 Stern actually adopted a value function with a very low positive utility discount 
rate, but that rate was used to reflect an exogenous risk of extinction. His 
approach was consistent with a utility discount rate of zero, so long as extinction 
risks can be captured in some other way (as indeed they can be). 
32 See Stern (2007, p. 52, n. 10). Elsewhere in the Review Stern suggests that this 
is actually a flawed approach to the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption. See, for example, pp. 33–4, box 2.1, and p. 34, n. 6. 
33 Stern, 2007, p. 32. 
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focused V-function described and employed by Broome, and indeed 
Broome was acknowledged in the Stern Review for being an influential 
advisor.34 And yet, despite working with a V-function that self-consciously 
ignores at least one set of morally crucial considerations—considerations 
that Stern himself seems to think are relevant to policy—Stern’s headline 
conclusion was that “prompt and strong action is clearly warranted.”35 This 
is what we would expect from someone who subscribes to (3). 
One can therefore find in the Stern Review traces of many of the 
approaches to the V-function canvassed in this section, but without a 
methodological discussion of whether these elements are compatible with 
one another, or why definitive policy conclusions can be derived from V-
functions (and thus SCCs) that reflect only a subset of policy-relevant 
considerations. In flagging this I do not mean to reject the Stern Review’s 
ultimate policy conclusions. I mean only to suggest that future economic 
analyses of climate change will be all the stronger if they attend to the 
issues, distinctions, and tensions raised in this section. 
12.4. The Social Cost of Carbon: From Theory to Trump 
With the express aim of informing climate policy in the United Kingdom, the 
Stern Review was commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 2005, 
and was released in 2006. By contrast, it was not until 2007 that the US 
                                               
34 Stern, 2007, p. 32. 
35 Stern, 2007, p. xv. 
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Supreme Court compelled the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions as part of its responsibilities under the 
Clean Air Act.36 One year later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared 
that federal agencies could no longer fail to put a price on carbon emissions, 
holding that while there may be a range of reasonable numbers for the SCC, 
“the value of carbon emissions reductions is certainly not zero.”37 Partly as a 
result of these rulings, the Obama administration in 2009 formed the 
Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (IWG), which 
issued its first set of SCC figures in 2010.38 These figures were later updated 
in 2013 and 2015, and were used by the Obama administration’s EPA to 
underwrite its Clean Power Plan.39 However, on March 28, 2017, President 
Donald Trump issued an executive order that disbanded the IWG, directed 
federal agencies not to use IWG’s SCC results, and instead directed agencies 
to rely on 2003 guidance (OMB Circular A-4) issued by George W. Bush’s 
Office of Management and Budget.40 Most recently, an expert panel of the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS), 
responding to a previous request for guidance by the IWG, issued a major 
                                               
36 127 S Ct 1438 (April 2, 2007). 
37 Center for Biological Diversity vs. NHTSA, 538F.3d 1172, 1200; 9th Cir., 2008. 
38 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2010. 
39 US Environmental Protection Agency, 2015. 
40 White House, 2017. 
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report on how the US’s SCC values could be updated and improved in light 
of developments in the peer-reviewed literature.41 
The IWG approach improved upon the status quo ante in 2010 by 
projecting SCC values for the year 2015 between $4.70 and $64.90, with 
a “central value” of $23.80 (in 2007 dollars). In its 2015 update, the 
corresponding range became $11 to $105, with a central value of $36. 
Much of the IWG’s methodology was in line with what I have described in 
this chapter. Employing three of the leading “integrated assessment 
models” (IAMs), the analysis began with descriptions of the “business-as-
usual” (BAU) consumption path and then “pulsed” that path with one ton 
of CO2. Next, the models estimated the temperature increases consequent 
on the pulse, and then the annual decreases in consumption (i.e. “climate 
damages”) consequent on the increase in temperature. The resulting 
stream of incremental damages was then discounted back to the year in 
which the pulse occurred in order to arrive at that year’s SCC value. 
In the IWG’s analysis, each IAM began with five possible BAU paths. 
Each path was then pulsed with an extra ton of CO2 10,000 times, with 
each of these 10,000 “model runs” selecting at random from a probability 
density function expressing climate science’s best understanding of the 
complex relationship between greenhouse gas concentration and 
temperature increase. This exercise yielded 150,000 streams of climate 
                                               
41 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017. 
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damages (3 IAMs × 5 BAU paths × 10,000 runs), each of which was then 
discounted back to present values using the three constant discount rates 
of 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent. The 150,000 SCC values for each 
discount rate were then averaged to yield the IWG’s SCC value for that 
discount rate, and a fourth SCC value (the upper end of the ranges noted 
earlier) was produced by reporting the SCC value at the 95th percentile 
using the central 3 percent discount rate.42 
The follow-up NAS report rightly criticized the IWG for using 
constant discount rates instead of constructing discount rates using the 
Ramsey methodology discussed in Section 12.2.43 Because it is derived 
from the conceptually fundamental V-function, the Ramsey approach is 
theoretically appropriate and allows for the possibility (unlikely in the 
short term, but possible in the very long term) that consumption discount 
rates become negative due to the severe damages imposed by 
unmitigated climate change. (Consumption discount rates will be negative 
if g in equation (5) is negative and if the absolute value of the product of g 
and 𝜂 is greater than the utility discount rate.) Negative discount rates 
have the effect of placing more weight on future outcomes (relative to 
equivalent outcomes in the present). 
                                               
42 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2010. 
43 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017, pp. 18, 169. 
See Kelleher and Wagner (forthcoming) for a further important correction to the 
NAS report related to the Ramsey discounting methodology. 
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Both the IWG and NAS adopt the revealed preference approach to 
value functions discussed in Section 12.3. In defending its highest 
constant consumption discount rate (5 percent), the IWG argues that 
“many individuals smooth consumption by borrowing with credit cards that 
have relatively high rates . . . [T]he high interest rates that credit-
constrained individuals accept suggest that some account should be given 
to the discount rates revealed by their behavior.”44 And although the NAS 
rejects the IWG’s use of constant discount rates, the NAS agrees that 
(certainty-equivalent) consumption discount rates should be “consistent, 
over the next several decades, with consumption rates of interest”—that 
is, they should be consistent with the consumption rates of indifference 
that individuals reveal in their everyday consumer behavior.45 The IWG 
and NAS therefore both face the objections to revealed preference 
approaches set out in Section 12.3. 
Nevertheless, the IWG and NAS approaches might very well be 
superior to the approach we are likely to see from the Trump 
administration. While OMB Circular A-4 was not written with climate 
economics in mind, its guidance suggests that streams of incremental 
climate damages should be discounted at two different rates: 3 percent 
and 7 percent. The 3 percent value, like the IWG’s central value of 3 
                                               
44 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2010, p. 19. 
45 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017, p. 180. 
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percent, results from a revealed preference approach that calibrates 
society’s consumption discount rate by looking to the rate at which actual 
individuals are willing to trade present consumption for future 
consumption (what the NAS calls the “consumption rate of interest”). As 
noted, the Ramsey-inspired approach is theoretically preferable, but at 
least in its focus on a 3 percent discount rate OMB Circular A-4 hews 
closely to the Obama administration’s IWG’s central value. Things change, 
however, with Circular A-4’s introduction of a 7 percent discount rate. 
The 7 percent rate is meant to represent the opportunity cost of 
capital, or the average rate of return earned by private investments. Let 
us set aside the question of whether the correct rate for this is 7 percent 
and ask: why should one use the opportunity cost of capital as a discount 
rate? The answer will be familiar from private investment decisions. If one 
is choosing between investments A and B, and investment A yields a 6 
percent return and B yields 7 percent, then one should choose B—other 
things being equal and assuming the upfront costs of each investment are 
the same. A different but equivalent way to arrive at this conclusion is to 
discount A’s future payout at the rate of return offered by the best 
alternative investment (in this case B), and then to subtract from this 
discounted value the initial cost of the investment. If the resulting value is 
negative, that signifies that the best alternative investment (B) is better 
than the investment under investigation (A). In recommending 7 percent 
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as an acceptable discount rate, OMB Circular A-4 is essentially directing 
federal agencies to keep an eye on the opportunity costs—i.e. the best 
alternative investments—of federal projects. 
Even if 7 percent is a reasonable estimate of the long-term rate of 
return on private investment (and there are good reasons to doubt that it 
is),46 it is widely agreed in the theoretical literature that this is the wrong 
way to take opportunity costs into account, especially for projects having 
long-term effects. The superior way, as indeed Circular A-4 itself notes, is 
to view the benefits of foregone projects as a cost, rather than as a 
discount rate.47 To the extent that investment in project A displaces 
project B, project B’s annual payouts should be deducted from the annual 
payouts of A. To work out B’s payouts, one will of course have to take into 
account the rate of return one could have received if one had invested in B 
instead: first one determines the incremental improvements in 
consumption made possible by B, and then one discounts those back to a 
single present value using consumption discount rates, which, as we’ve 
seen, Circular A-4 sets at 3 percent. So instead of featuring in the analysis 
as a discount rate, B’s 7 percent rate of return should be used to calculate 
the consumption gains one foregoes by investing in A instead. As 
Dasgupta, Sen, and Marglin put it in 1972, the productivity of capital is 
                                               
46 Council of Economic Advisors, 2017. 
47 Office of Management and Budget, 2003, p. 33. 
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relevant because “the present value of the consumption stream forgone 
when such investment is displaced . . . is relevant, and this present value 
is relevant as a cost, not as a discount rate.”48 
The method advocated by Dasgupta, Sen, and Marglin carries even 
more weight in contexts where a project’s impacts will be felt for many 
years to come. That is because OMB’s 7 percent method asks us to 
consider only the upfront costs of making the capital investment. It does 
not consider the downstream costs associated with whatever productive 
activity makes the investment’s payout possible in the first place. To see 
this, consider the example that compared A and B in the previous 
paragraph. Suppose again that B pays investors an annual 7 percent 
return and that when we discount A’s future benefits at 7 percent and 
then subtract the upfront cost of A’s investment, we get a negative 
number. According to Circular A-4’s logic, that suggests B is the better 
investment. But now suppose that B is an investment in a paper company, 
and that while the paper company pays out stock dividends at 7 percent 
per year, the company’s pollution creates consumption damages for third 
parties for decades to come. Surely a full accounting of A’s and B’s relative 
merits should take this into account, but Circular A-4’s 7 percent method 
does not do this. Dasgupta, Sen, and Marglin’s method does. For the latter 
directs us to compare each project by working out the net incremental 
                                               
48 Dasgupta et al., 1972, p. 171. 
 33 
consumption impact of each, and discounting each net impact stream at 
the consumption discount rate. This method, which is broadly in line with 
that recommended by the IWG and NAS, has the virtue of not being 
unduly swayed by ostensibly high rates of return for investors that involve 
significant costs down the line for uninvolved parties. 
In the end the Trump administration leaned on OMB Circular A-4’s 7 
percent method to help arrive at quite low SCC values. Almost certainly 
fearing a judicial ruling requiring it to retain at least some SCC value, the 
Trump EPA combined the 7 percent discount rate with the view that SCC 
values for US public policy should take into account only domestic climate 
damages. This resulted in a “central” SCC value of $1 (it had been $51 in 
the last Obama-era analysis).49 The move from a global to a domestic SCC 
obviously raises its own economic ethical issues, which I lack the space to 
discuss here.50 But all on its own, the use of a 7 percent discount rate was 
a significant mistake from the standpoint of both economics and ethics. 
12.5. Conclusion 
Shortly after President Trump’s executive order, and in response to the 
recent NAS report, the venerable nonprofit organization Resources for the 
Future announced that it will lead “a multi-year, multidisciplinary research 
                                               
49 See Armstrong (2017). These figures are denominated in 2017 dollars, whereas 
the final Obama-era analysis used 2007 dollars. 
50 I know of no extensive philosophical discussion of this move. For the most 
comprehensive economic analysis I know of, see Ceronsky et al. (2014, pp. 5–
12). 
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initiative that will advance the NAS recommendations and lead to a 
comprehensive update of the social cost of carbon estimates, as well as 
enhance the capabilities of decisionmakers and analysts worldwide who use 
the social cost of carbon to measure the benefits of emissions reductions.”51 
This is heartening news at a time when federal climate policy analysis (and 
policy) has been anything but heartening. My aim in this chapter has been to 
assist this and related efforts by illuminating some of the theoretical and 
philosophical dimensions that require further investigation and discussion 
among and between economists and philosophers, especially (but not only) 
in the age of Trump. 
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